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INTRODUCTION
Many suggest that the Food and Drug Administration (the ‘FDA’1)
does not adequately regulate dietary supplements.2 Approximately one in
five Americans reports using dietary supplements.3 Yet, as will be
explained and documented later in this Comment, dietary supplements can
be dangerous, cause a person to forgo proper healthcare, and be a waste of
money. The FDA can regulate dietary supplements by monitoring the
claims borne on labels. Roughly speaking, drugs and the claims that drugs
carry on their labels are highly regulated, whereas dietary supplements and
the claims they bear on their labels face less stringent standards.
Consumers, unaware of the FDA’s regulatory structure, have a hard time
distinguishing between drug claims and dietary supplement claims.4 The
FDA has solicited studies on consumer interpretation of labels and found
mixed results.5
1. FDA sometimes mentions the term ‘disease’ with single quotation marks, and
sometimes with double quotation marks. This Comment uses single quotation marks to
mention, but not use, a word or phrase, unless within the context of a quotation of the work
of another, in which case the punctuation is left as it is in the original. To illustrate,
‘disease’ has seven letters (and is thus a mentioning of the term), but disease does not have
seven letters (and is thus a use of the term). Moreover, this Comment uses double quotation
marks either to quote a source, or to use as scare quotes, which indicate that a term is used
in an abstracted sense. The phrase ‘the concept of’ refers to what people ordinarily think of
something, independent of its technical, ostensive definition.
2. See, e.g., Alessa Thomas, Note, Making Sense of Supplements: Suggestions for
Improving the Regulation of Dietary Supplements in the United States, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 203 (2010) (arguing for Congressional action in changing regulation of dietary
supplements); Jennifer Akre Hill, Note, Creating Balance: Problems Within DSHEA and
Suggestions of Reform, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 361 (2006) (same); Iona N. Kaiser, Note,
Dietary Supplements: Can the Law Control the Hype?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1249 (2000)
(same)
3. Rob Stein, Alternative Remedies Gaining Popularity, WASH. POST, May 28, 2004,
at A1 (containing a government survey of 31,000 people).
4. For example, one study found that consumers who trusted that the government
would not allow useless or dangerous products to enter the marketplace and consumers who
tended to discount disclaimers borne on dietary supplements both believed their biases were
confirmed. Karen France & Paula Bone, Policy Makers’ Paradigms and Evidence from
Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels, 39 J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 27, 34
(2005). See generally Matthew Lindsey, Note, Dietary Supplements and Structure-Function
Claims: The Dysfunctional Structure of Current Regulation, 5 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 201
(2009) (providing a general discussion of the problems with FDA regulation of dietary
supplement claims).
5. Transcript of Public Meeting: Assessing Consumer Perceptions of Health Claims,
November 17, 2005, FDA, available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabe
ling/LabelingNutrition/ucm109638.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (discussing how in some
cases the results of FDA-solicited research are surprising. For example, claims that
scientists had thought would be moderately trustworthy were interpreted by consumer
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The following examples will help illustrate the difficulty that
consumers (and the FDA) face in making informed, rational choices about
their health. A dietary supplement website sells a product that advertises
the following claim:
Alpha Lipoic Acid (ALA) is an antioxidant that has two main
benefits. The first benefit is the removal of free radicals from
your body and the functional enhancement of other antioxidants,
such as vitamins A, C and E. Free radicals are waste products
that are created when your body turns food into energy. Ridding
your body of free radicals could deter the onset of many health
related problems. The second benefit of ALA is its “insulin
mimicking” effects - the dramatic decrease in glucose levels.
Insulin mimicking also provides increased concentrations of
glutathione in the cells, which has been shown to speed up
recovery from weight training. It also enhances muscle cell
nutrient intake and protein turnover.6
Alternatively, perhaps comically, another website sells a product that
advertises the following claim:
Lucidrol is scientifically designed to push the minds’ [sic] focus,
cognitive clarity and cerebral sharpness to previously
unachievable levels. In today’s stressful environment, we all
struggle with the constant demands from work, personal
relationships and most importantly, our daily training regimen.
Quality training demands the mind be focused in a way that
maximizes the precious time spent in a gym environment. If you
can achieve tunnel vision - a single enhanced focus on the goals
ahead—you will achieve desired results—whatever they may be.
Lucidrol—Ultra Cognitive Enhancer Achieve Tunnel Vision
Stimulant Free.7
As will be explained in further detail later later, the first claim (for ALA)
needs pre-market approval of a certain sort, while the second claim (for
Lucidrol) does not, though the FDA requires all claims be truthful and not
misleading. With claims such as the one accompanying Lucidrol, it is hard
to get at the precise problem, because the claims use vague terminology.
subjects as being more trustworthy with a disclaimer—that a claim had not been reviewed
by the FDA—than claims without such a disclaimer).
6. Universal Nutrition Alpha Lipoic Acid 100mg, 60 Capsules, A1SUPPLEMENTS, http:
//www.a1supplements.com/Alpha-Lipoic-Acid-100mg-60-Capsules-p-17094.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2013). A1Supplements is based in Louisville, Tennessee.
7. SUPPLEMENT WAREHOUSE, http://www.laurbanfitness.com/shop/product_view.asp
?id=2144665&StoreID=5960A85CA8DB4D57959B40AC607865BF&private_product=1
(last visited Apr. 13, 2013). The Supplement Warehouse has its corporate headquarters in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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Lucidrol does not bear a claim that it cures disease, yet does seem to
claim that it can enhance the body’s function beyond what is normal—a
claim that one would think would require substantial scrutiny. The reader
is encouraged to explore the websites mentioned for other examples of
claims about dietary supplements. This is obviously dangerous. If the
claims borne by dietary supplements are vague, and FDA regulation is lax,
regulatory problems will ensue.
Looking at the issue of regulation of dietary supplements abstractly
rather than how the FDA, in fact, regulates dietary supplements, there are a
number of ways that the FDA could improve regulation of claims made on
such products. The FDA could: (1) enhance its post-market review of
claims relating to dietary supplements, (2) require pre-market approval for
such claims, (3) greatly restrict the content of such claims by outright
prohibition, as with a list, or (4) greatly expand the category of so-called
“disease claims” so as to catch more of the inappropriate claims made
about dietary supplements. This essay develops and defends the fourth
proposal.
In 1998 and 1999, the FDA considered changing its definition of
disease in accordance with the wishes of many health care practitioners and
against the wishes of many in the dietary supplement industry. The FDA
opted to forgo the opportunity. The thesis of this Comment is that the FDA
could better regulate dietary supplements by first improving its definition
of disease and second by removing all references to disease in its
regulations altogether. A great deal of legal scholarship in this area focuses
on changing or repealing the statute that sets up the regulatory framework
for dietary supplement claims.8 This Comment has a different approach—it
focuses on problems inherent in FDA’s regulations and proposes change
within FDA’s claimed statutory authority about dietary supplement claims.

8. There are a few proposals in scholarship for the FDA to more stringently regulate
other areas of the dietary supplement industry, such as manufacturing. See, e.g., Lars Noah
& Barbara A. Noah, A Drug By Any Other Name. . .?: Paradoxes in Dietary Supplement
Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 165 (2006) (proposing that the FDA assume
control over dietary supplements on the basis of manufacturing processes and over safety in
accordance with current statutory authority). This Comment focuses on FDA regulation of
claims borne by dietary supplements.

TUPA COMMENT - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/3/2013 4:17 PM

FDA’S DEFINITION OF DISEASE

847

I. THE FDA’S DEFINITIONS OF ‘FOOD,’ ‘DRUGS,’ AND ‘DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS,’ AND CORRESPONDING REGULATIONS
A. FDA’s Definition of ‘Food’ and Corresponding Regulation
The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (‘FD&C Act’) gave the FDA
authority to regulate, in varying ways, food, drugs, cosmetics and medical
devices.9 The term ‘food’ has a technical meaning for the FDA in the
FD&C Act: (1) articles used for food and drink for man or other animals,
(2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article.10
In the FDA’s technical definition, the term ‘food’ is used
ambiguously, both in its ordinary, colloquial sense embedded in the FDA’s
technical definition of ‘food’ and also in its technical sense to include gum,
drink, ingredients, etc. Note that there is explicit reference to the “use” of a
product, implying that the relevant criterion is what the product is used for,
rather than the purpose for which it is made, distributed or sold. The
colloquial use of ‘food,’ (1) has been interpreted as indicating an article
used “primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive value.”11 Throughout the
remainder of this Comment, ‘food’ will refer to its technical FDA
definition.
For the purposes of this Comment, the focus of the FDA’s regulation
of food will be in the context of labeling. Under the FD&C Act, food
cannot be misbranded in the sense that the label cannot be “false or
misleading in any particular.”12 The FD&C Act has numerous specific
requirements, such as a requirement that the label contain a list of
ingredients, in descending order of predominance.13 Also, food labels can
contain nutrient claims of certain sorts.
Under the current regime, food can bear a so-called “health claim.”
The three types of health claims are: (1) implicit health claims (reference
to the nutrient content of food), (2) general health claims (reference to
promotion of health), and (3) explicit health claims (reference to the
prevention of specific diseases).
Explicit claims are similar to disease claims that drugs can bear.
Disease claims consist of two components: a substance and a related

9. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321–99 (1938) [hereafter FD&C Act].
10. Id. § 321(f). Some items colloquially referred to as “food” are not under the FDA’s
jurisdiction, such as meat, which falls under the jurisdiction of the USDA. Set aside this
qualification for this Comment.
11. Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1983).
12. FD&C Act § 403(a).
13. FD&C Act § 403(i).

TUPA COMMENT - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

848

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/3/2013 4:17 PM

[Vol. 15:3

condition.14 Disease claims assert that a substance diagnoses, treats,
prevents, cures, or mitigates a specific disease or disease generally.15 For
the purposes of this Comment, the third class of health claims will be called
‘disease-prevention claims’ and this class is not to be understood as socalled “disease-claims.” Understandably, this terminology is confusing, yet
the FDA uses such terms in its regulations. All disease-prevention claims
for food, small though the set may be, must be approved by the FDA prior
to labeling.16 There are two categories of disease-prevention claims for
foods: qualified disease-prevention claims and unqualified diseaseprevention claims. A qualified disease-prevention claim for food is preapproved only if there is credible scientific evidence that supports it.17 An
unqualified disease-prevention claim for food is pre-approved only if there
is significant scientific agreement about the claim. 18 Although the
standards for food disease-prevention claims are somewhat vague, FDA
treats these as very restricted classes. There are only twelve unrestricted
disease-prevention claims approved for food.19 Examples include a link
between: (a) calcium and osteoporosis, (b) sodium and hypertension, and
(c) fiber-containing grain products, fruits, and vegetables and cancer.20
The relatively new, fourth category of health claims for foods was
defined in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (‘NLEA’) and
subsequent notices. The fourth health claim provides “dietary guidance” to
consumers.21 Such guidance does not make reference to either of the
elements of a disease claim (the substance and the disease-related
condition).22 Dietary guidance, unlike disease-prevention claims for food,
does not require pre-approval, but rather, merely FDA notice. The FDA’s
conception of this sort of health claim is somewhat inchoate, and the
category is still being shaped by public and private input.23
There is another important class of claims that foods can bear—
structure-function claims. Structure-function claims are discussed in the
context of dietary supplements in Part I.C., infra, and more substantially
thereafter.

14. 58 Fed. Reg. 2,478, 2,487 (Jan. 6, 1993).
15. FD&C Act § 403(r)(6).
16. 68 Fed. Reg. 66,040, 66,041 (Nov. 25, 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 21. C.F.R. § 101, subpart E.
20. Id.
21. 58 Fed. Reg. 2,478, 2,487 (Jan. 6, 1993).
22. Id.
23. See 68 Fed. Reg. 66,040 (Nov. 25, 2003) (explaining the FDA’s rationale behind
the proposed rulemaking for dietary guidance health claims).
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B. The Definition of ‘Drug’ and Corresponding Regulation
Under the FD&C Act, the term ‘drug’ has a specific technical
meaning.
The term ‘drug’ means: (A) articles recognized in the official
United
States
Pharmacopoeia,
official
Homeopathic
Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National
Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for
use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B) or
(C).24
The FDA’s definition of the term ‘drug,’ like the definition of ‘food,’
includes the concept of use rather than design. ‘Drug’ is defined in such a
way that no drug can also be food. For purposes of jurisdiction, the
definition of ‘drug’ is in a sense part of a disjunction within the regulatory
framework of the FDA, since a product that does not meet the definition,
but makes a “disease claim,” is thereby subject to regulation as a drug.
The FDA asserts that it has jurisdiction over products as drugs by
virtue of a product merely meeting condition (C) of its definition. The
FDA’s definition of drug, however, is not entirely disjunctive. For
example, the United States Pharmacopoeia includes express dietary
supplements, and courts have been hesitant to treat a product’s meeting
condition (A) as sufficient to establish drug-jurisdiction over that product.25
Meeting condition (B) alone is also sufficient to establish drug jurisdiction.
This will be explained in greater detail later in this Comment.
Drugs are subject to a much more stringent set of FDA regulations
than foods. Prior to the FD&C Act (recall that the first statute is from
1938), drugs had only been regulated at the point of sale or use.26 By
requiring that the FDA receive notification of all new drugs (‘pre-market
notification’), the FD&C Act gave FDA power of review. Later, in 1962,
24. FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2006).
25. PETER BARTON HUTT, FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 40 (3d ed. 2007) (citing National
Nutritional Foods Assoc. v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 788–89 (2d Cir. 1974) and National
Nutritional Foods Assoc. v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 337–38 (2d Cir. 1977)) (describing the
courts’ hesitancy to allow FDA drug jurisdiction over products listed in the works
mentioned in (A)). Whether the section of the Pharmacopeia (dealing with dietary
supplements) is a supplement to the official United States Pharmacopeia listing might not be
material, as (A) includes supplements. See USP Verification Services, U.S. PHARMACOPEIAL
CONVENTION, available at http://www.usp.org/USPVerified/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
26. Food and Drug Act of 1906, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1–15 (2006) (repealed 1938).
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the FDA gained the power of review over whether a drug is safe, effective,
and properly labeled (‘pre-market approval’). The burden of proof is on
the drug-maker, and the standards that the FDA employs are high. The
FDA’s regulation of drugs includes, but is not limited to, labeling. For
example, access to drugs is based on a distinction in the FD&C Act
between prescription and over-the-counter drugs.27 Any drug that falls
under the prescription regulations, yet is sold without a prescription, is
thereby mislabeled.28 The FDA’s regulation of drugs is thus much more
stringent than its regulation of foods.29 Correspondingly, drugs labels can
make much more significant claims, such as disease claims.
The class of disease claims includes statements of many kinds. The
Code of Federal Regulations contains a list of disease claims.30 For
example, no claim can be made that a product “(i) has an effect on a
specific disease or class of diseases [or] (ii) has an effect on the
characteristic signs or symptoms of a specific disease or class of diseases,
using scientific or lay terminology.”31 Also, a claim that a product “[h]as
an effect on an abnormal condition associated with a natural state or
process, if the abnormal condition is uncommon or can cause significant or
permanent harm” is forbidden.32 Other factors taken into account are the
name of the product, statements about the formulation of the product, and
citations to other sources.33 Most importantly, though, any claim that a
product is intended “to diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, or prevent disease” is
a disease claim.34
C. FDA’s Definition of ‘Dietary Supplement’ and Corresponding
Regulation
Colloquially, dietary supplements might seem to be food or drugs,
given FDA definitions thus far. Dietary supplements are used for both food
and drink in an ordinary sense. However, it might seem that dietary
supplements may be used in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or
prevention of disease, or that they are intended to affect the structure or

27. FD&C Act § 503(b)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 535(b)(1) (2006).
28. Id.
29. Admittedly, this Comment does not fully explore the FDA’s regulations of food
and drugs, but for the purposes of this Comment, this basic account is sufficient.
30. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(g)(2).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(g)(2)(iv)(A)-(E).
34. Id.
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functions of the body. Alternatively, dietary supplements might fall into a
middle ground, somewhere between food and drugs.
Despite how dietary supplements seem to be categorized by the
ordinary consumer, the FDA is clear that dietary supplements are classified
as food. In the FD&C Act, Congress gave the FDA the power to regulate,
to some extent, the labeling of “vitamin, mineral, and other dietary
properties [of food,]” if it “is represented for special dietary uses.”35
Dietary supplements more clearly fall under the definition of those foods
represented for special dietary uses. However, the FD&C Act is far from
Congress’ most recent word on dietary supplements. The FDA struggled
for years to better regulate dietary supplements.36 After a series of small
regulatory changes regarding what the ordinary consumer would think of as
dietary supplements, Congress enacted the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act in 1994 (‘DSHEA’).37 The DSHEA made an explicit
classification for dietary supplements within the class of foods. Hutt
describes the DSHEA as “an even more overwhelming and humiliating
defeat for FDA than [earlier Congressional actions].”38
The following is the DSHEA definition of “dietary supplement”:
The DSHEA defines “dietary supplement” as:
(1) [A] product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the
diet that bears or contains one or more of the following dietary
ingredients:
(A) a vitamin;
(B) a mineral;
(C) an herb or other botanical;
(D) an amino acid;
(E) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by
increasing the total dietary intake; or
(F) a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination
of any ingredient described in clause (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E);
(2) [] a product that—
(A)(i) is intended for ingestion in a form described in section
[411](c)(1)(B)(i) of this title; or (ii) complies with section
[411](c)(1)(B)(ii) of this title;
(B) is not represented for use as a conventional food or as a sole
item of a meal or the diet; and
35. FD&C Act § 403(j), 21 U.S.C. § 343(j) (2006).
36. Peter Barton Hutt, U.S. Government Regulation of Food with Claims for Special
Physiological Value, in HUTT, supra note 25 at 261.
37. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325 (1994) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)).
38. See HUTT, supra note 25 at 261.
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(C) is labeled as a dietary supplement[.]39
First, note that subsection (E) is a catch-all group, in that it includes any
dietary substance for use to supplement the diet. This seems to have a
broad scope and could include substances one might assume to be drugs.
Second, with certain qualification, a dietary supplement must be intended
for ingestion. Thus, dietary supplements, for the most part, must be taken
by mouth and ingested.
Nothing in this definition explains Hutt’s assertion that the DSHEA
was an unusually overwhelming and humiliating defeat for FDA. These
are just definitions, and seem natural definitions for a regulatory body to
employ, given the subject matter. In order to explain Hutt’s evaluation, one
must proceed to the regulations that accompany the definitions.
Dietary supplements, by virtue of being classified as foods, are subject
to the labeling requirements of foods, such as the requirements of the 1938
FD&C Act that dietary supplement labels cannot be false or misleading.
The DSHEA in 1994, however, set up a special regulatory regime for
dietary supplements, which permitted labels to make new kinds of claims
for dietary supplements. These new label claims would have rendered the
dietary supplements ‘drugs’ under the FD&C Act. Specifically, the
DSHEA allows labels to contain statements that describe “the role of a
nutrient or dietary ingredient intended to affect the structure or function in
humans” or that characterize “the documented mechanism by which a
nutrient or dietary ingredient acts to maintain such structure or function.”40
Call these “structure-function claims.”
Structure-function claims are not disease claims. Rather, they assert
only that a dietary supplement stimulates, maintains, supports, regulates or
39. FD&C Act § 201(ff), 21 U.S.C. 321(ff)(2006). Section 411(c)(1)(B) refers to a
food which “(i) is intended for ingestion in tablet, capsule, powder, softgel, gelcap, or liquid
form, or (ii) if not intended for ingestion in such a form, is not represented as conventional
food and is not represented for use as a sole item of a mean or of the diet.” 21 U.S.C.
350(c)(1)(B) (2006).
40. FD&C Act § 403(r)(6), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A)(2006). Although the FDA’s
definition of disease does not play a prominent role in Hutt’s seminal casebook, the
definition is a regulation and plays a key role in numerous FDA guidance documents. See,
e.g., Guidance for Industry: Structure/Function Claims, Small Entity Compliance Guide,
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.f
da.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/DietarySup
plements/ucm103340.htm. The guide is set up for small dietary supplement makers,
marketers, and sellers who might not have easy access to an attorney. “Small” is defined as
having “total annual revenues of less than $20 million.” Id. Regulations on Statements
Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or
Function of the Body, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,624, 23,628 (proposed Apr. 29, 1998) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). Therefore, it is likely that some “small” dietary supplement
companies have easy access to attorneys, but not all such companies.
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promotes proper function in the human body.41 The FDA defines disease in
the following way:
For purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6), a ‘disease’ is damage to
an organ, part, structure, or system of the body such that it does
not function properly (e.g., cardiovascular disease), or a state of
health leading to such dysfunctioning (e.g., hypertension); except
that diseases resulting from essential nutrient deficiencies (e.g.,
scurvy, pellagra) are not included in this definition.42
This definition of disease is specific to the section of the U.S. Code on
dietary supplements. Thus, it does not have to be used by FDA in its
regulation of products that make disease claims under the drug regulation
scheme. Set this aside for now. The definition of disease within section
343(r)(6) provides two ways for a biological state to qualify as a disease
claim.43 First, the damage clause entails damage to a biological state or
function; an improper function constitutes a disease. Alternatively, the
causal clause entails that a state of health leading to such dysfunction also
constitutes a disease. These clauses are disjunctive. Lastly, there is an
exception to the ‘disease’ definition for regulatory purposes: The
exception for essential nutrient deficiencies permits certain foods to make
disease claims only if and because those foods would cure the nutrient
deficiency disease.44
Dietary supplements may contain structure-function claims but not
disease claims.45 Such structure-function claims may contain an assertion
that some products stimulate, maintain, support, regulate or promote
structure or function.46 Labels that include a structure-function claim must
also claim the following: “This statement has not been evaluated by the
Food and Drug Administration. This product is not intended to diagnose,
treat, cure, or prevent any disease.”47
41. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect
of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 21 C.F.R. § 101.93 (2012).
42. Certain Types of Statements for Dietary Supplements, 21 C.F.R. §
101.93(g)(2012).
43. ‘Disease’ will be understood in the FDA’s sense for the remainder of Part I of this
Comment.
44. There are further regulations on the essential nutrient deficiencies exception, such
as requirement of a statement of the prevalence of the nutrient deficiency disease in the
general population.
45. Dietary supplements, being foods, can make disease-prevention claims in certain
circumstances, but these are health claims, not disease claims.
46. FDA COMMISSION ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, GUIDANCE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, reprinted in HUTT, supra note 25, at 280.
47. In the example of Lucidrol, a disclaimer appears at the bottom of the Lucidrol
advertisement. The statement is not hidden, though one has to scroll down to see it past the
product description and the “buy it” link. The disclaimer for ALA is visible without
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As noted above, Hutt claims that the DSHEA was a “humiliating
defeat” for FDA. This is so because the FDA wanted to regulate structurefunction claims. Prior to the DSHEA, FDA largely treated structurefunction claims as drug claims. FDA’s only real concession in the DSHEA
was the disclaimer that must accompany any structure-function claim.
However, this is a small concession given that FDA sought to stringently
regulate structure-function claims.
D. Public Policy and FDA Regulation of Dietary Supplements
The FDA is concerned primarily with public health and claims that
without their regulations the public at large would be in danger.48 The FDA
also has other concerns, such as reducing fraud and other undesirable
market practices, but these are comparably weak priorities compared to the
goal of protecting and promoting public health.49
With regard to dietary supplements in particular, the FDA has a more
complex line of concerns. In the arena of dietary supplements, the FDA
has five competing values: (1) public health,50 (2) waste of money and
fraud, (3) freedom of consumers, (4) commercial free speech,51 and (5)
foregone healthcare. A number of books and articles focus on the public
health issue and argue that the DSHEA is somehow inadequate.52 FDA

scrolling down. The reader is encouraged to go to the websites in the introduction and
examine the contexts of the disclaimer.
48. See What We Do, FDA, available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatW
eDo/default.htm (last updated June 19, 2012) (asserting in its mission statement that FDA is
responsible for protecting public health).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Gerald F. Masoudi, Developments in Food and Drug Law, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 107
(2005); Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. Public Health
Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31 (2011).
52. See, e.g., DAN HURLEY, NATURAL CAUSES: DEATH, LIES, AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA’S VITAMIN AND HERBAL SUPPLEMENT INDUSTRY (2006) (detailing the dangers of
the dietary supplement industry); Lauren Manning, The Skinny on the Fop Flop: Why the
FDA Must Tighten the Belt on Fop Labeling in Light of the Obesity Crisis, 38 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1227 (2010) (arguing that FDA regulation of weight-loss claims on dietary
supplements is inadequate in light of the obesity crisis); Rahi Azizi, Comment,
“Supplementing” the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with Greater Regulatory
Authority over Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending the Dietary Supplemental Health
and Education Act, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2010) (arguing that FDA fails to regulate
“nutraceuticals”—functional foods taken to enhance health, such as botanical products—
adequately); Joseph K. Dier, Comment, S.O.S. from the FDA: A Cry for Help in the World
of Unregulated Dietary Supplements, 74 ALB. L. REV. 385 (2010-2011) (arguing for a repeal
of DSHEA on public health grounds); Richard Nowak, Comment, DSHEA’s Failure: Why a
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clearly treats some values as more important than others. For example, it
does not heavily regulate products that bear anti-aging claims.53 Perhaps
the FDA is less concerned about foregone healthcare with products that
bear anti-aging claims, since aging is a universal, unpreventable process.
II. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF FDA’S DEFINITION OF ‘DISEASE’
Although it has not been discussed in the literature, the FDA’s
definition of disease bears little resemblance to the ordinary concept of
disease. This Comment will discuss how the FDA’s definition is both
overbroad and underbroad in comparison with the ordinary concept of
disease. Moreover, it will show that the boundary between structurefunction claims and disease claims is not clear. All of this leads to
confusion about the regulation of dietary supplements.
I will begin with the matter of overbreadth of the FDA’s definition.
Imagine that a dietary supplement manufacturer sells a product called
“Skele-grow.” The label of Skele-grow bears the claim: “Skele-grow aids
the bone-growth process in case of broken bones.” This is a disease
claim—the sort of claim that the FDA must regulate heavily. Yet broken
bones are not, according to the ordinary concept, diseases. Indeed, the
FDA would regulate the claim on Skele-grow as a disease claim. The FDA
defines ‘disease’ as “damage to an organ, part, structure, or system of the
body such that it does not function properly (e.g., cardiovascular disease),
or a state of health leading to such dysfunctioning (e.g., hypertension);
except that diseases resulting from essential nutrient deficiencies (e.g.,
scurvy, pellagra) are not included in this definition.”54 The claim on Skelegrow would clearly be a damage clause claim. The broken bone is damage
to the body such that the body does not function properly. A broken bone
is a disease according to the FDA’s definition in this particular area of
regulation. This is contrary to the ordinary concepts of disease, injury, and
broken bones. However, this is just as it should be for the purpose of

Proactive Approach to Dietary Supplement Regulation is Needed to Effectively Protect
Consumers, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045 (arguing that DSHEA fails to protect consumers
because of its reactive approach to dietary supplement regulation); see also supra text
accompanying note 2.
53. Also, as will be shown, this shapes the FDA’s regulations to some extent, and
explains why products, such as those making anti-aging claims, are not heavily regulated (or
the regulations are not enforced), while other products are regulated.
54. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 FED. REG. 1009 (proposed Jan. 06,
2000).
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regulating Skele-grow.55
Not all examples of overbreadth will be so unproblematic. Take
pregnancy or aging, for example. These would clearly meet the state of
health or causal clause of the definition of disease because they are states of
health leading to biological dysfunction. The phrase “leading to” can only
plausibly invoke a threshold causal concept. Pregnancy and aging cause
dysfunction to a greater degree and with a greater probability than many
conditions one ordinarily thinks of as disease. The FDA has dealt with
these two problematic cases with pure stipulation: pregnancy and aging are
not diseases.56 However, given that the FDA must, on grounds of public
policy, regulate any product that bears a claim “ingesting this product
prevents pregnancy,” the FDA simply made a rule that explicitly forbade a
dietary supplement from bearing “claims related to pregnancy on their
products based on the agency’s recently issued structure/function rule.”57
The FDA, in its so-called natural state exception, has also stipulated
that certain conditions associated with certain “natural states” are not
diseases. Again, we turn to pregnancy and aging. Conditions associated to
these natural states are morning sickness and presbyopia, an inability to
change eye focus from near to far and vice versa associated with aging.58
Because such conditions fall into the natural state exception, they are not
diseases. Of course, the natural state exception is misnamed—it provides
an exception to the definition of disease for conditions associated with
natural states, but not the natural states themselves (which as it turns out for
the two examples provided above, pregnancy and aging, are also
exceptions).59
Underbreadth creates similar problems in relation to the ordinary
conception of disease. Recall that there are two clauses to the FDA’s
definition of disease: the damage clause and the state of health, or causal,
55. As it turns out, there are several other examples of overbreadth in which the FDA
would get the definition wrong, but the regulation just right. For example, if a person is
poisoned, she does not thereby have a disease, at least with some kinds of poison. Yet
purported antidotes to poison must be regulated as are purported cures for diseases, and
FDA has the power to so regulate by its definition of ‘disease.’
56. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, supra note 54, at 1020.
57. HUTT, supra note 25, at 281.
58. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, supra note 54.
59. This misnaming has created some confusion. For example, Hutt says: “FDA
concluded that it is not appropriate to treat common nonserious conditions associated with
natural sates as diseases. These conditions include adolescence, the menstrual cycle,
pregnancy, menopause and aging.” HUTT, supra note 25, at 281 (emphasis added). Surely,
Hutt means to assert: “These natural states include adolescence, pregnancy and aging; and
these conditions, respectively are growth, morning sickness and menopause.”
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clause. On the one hand, the damage clause applies very well to injuries.
Injuries such as broken bones, knife wounds, bullet wounds, and organ
failure caused by trauma to the body are all instances of damage to a part of
the body such that it does not function properly. On the other hand, the
damage clause does not fully capture conditions that fall into the ordinary
concept of disease. It is difficult to characterize the early stages of cancer
as damage. Although it is true that cancer is a genetic mutation, a genetic
mutation is not obviously damage to an organ, part, structure or function of
the body such that it does not function properly (of course cancer might
cause such damage, but that is another clause of the definition). The result
is that a lot of regulatory weight is pushed onto the state of health clause of
the FDA’s definition.
The state of health clause captures many diseases, but not all.
Presumably, the FDA would suggest that its state of health clause is truly
counterfactual in the sense that the clause really means “state of health that
if untreated leads (with a certain probability) to such dysfunction (of a
certain degree).” The FDA can only plausibly mean the counterfactual
variation since some diseases very rarely lead to dysfunction due to
effectiveness of treatment, mitigation and prevention. So, it may seem at
first that the FDA could easily deal with any underbreadth issue stemming
from easily treatable diseases. However, there are diseases that simply
develop so slowly that threats from overdiagnosis and overtreatment lead to
greater dysfunction than does non-treatment. Some think that certain kinds
of prostate cancer have this feature—that for reasons of overdiagnosis and
overtreatment, the health outcomes are worse for those who get screened
and then treated for prostate cancer than those who do not.60 Clearly
prostate cancer is a disease according to the ordinary conception, but
certain kinds might not pass the threshold for “leading” to dysfunction.
The overbreadth and underbreadth analysis is very revealing. First, it
shows that the FDA is shaping its regulation of disease claims in part by
understandable political motives, such as the desire to avoid treating
pregnancy as a disease. Second, it shows even though the FDA’s definition
is overbroad, this overbreadth leads to proper regulation, such as regulation
of certain injury claims. Third, it shows that the FDA’s definition of
disease is problematic to apply even to ordinary disease, and that this likely
results in regulatory problems for claims borne on any ingested products,
especially dietary supplements.
60. See Michael Barry, Screening for Prostate Cancer—The Controversy that Refuses
to Die, 360 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1351, 1353 (2009) (discussing two different large-scale studies
and concluding that “[s]ome well-informed clinicians and patients will still see these tradeoffs [of screening and treating versus non-screening] as favorable; others will see them as
unfavorable”).
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It appears that FDA is defining ‘disease’ not by its public, stated
definition in the statute, but by private rule. This rule is private because its
criteria are known only to the FDA. There must be a reason that such
biological conditions as pregnancy and aging are simply stipulated as nondiseases and yet some cancers are treated by the FDA as diseases even
though they fail to meet the stated definition. The reason is their private
definition of ‘disease.’ All things considered, it would be better to have a
definition of disease that has no exceptions to it by regulation and is
publicly known.
Now, turn to another sort of problem with the FDA’s definition of
disease and the regulation of dietary supplements: The border between
structure-function claims and disease claims is unclear. In particular, there
is a grey area with respect to maintenance and prevention of illness, which
dietary supplement labels exploit. Recall that structure-function claims
may contain an assertion that a product may stimulate, maintain, support,
regulate or promote structure or function.61
Now, one way of
understanding health is just as proper function of the human organism.
Therefore, a structure-function claim may contain an assertion that a
product may stimulate, maintain, support, regulate or promote health.
Moreover, it is plausible to think that health is the absence of disease in the
human organism. Now, a structure-function claim may contain an
assertion that a product maintains, supports, regulates, or promotes the
absence of disease. Now the structure-function claim is starting to
resemble a disease claim. The basic problem arises because if one adds to
the definition of a structure-function claim the very intuitive propositions
that (1) health is proper functioning and (2) health is the absence of disease
in the human organism, what results is a disease claim, explicitly the type
of claim dietary supplements are forbidden to make. So, dietary
supplements cannot name diseases or make other claims too closely tied to
the names or symptoms of diseases. And this is precisely the grey area of
regulation that dietary supplement manufacturers exploit. It should be clear
at this stage that the regulations are very difficult to enforce.
III. FDA’S PROPOSED DEFINITION OF ‘DISEASE’
Given the discussion above, whatever rule the FDA is following
delineating its class of disease claims, it is neither the ordinary concept
disease (since it covers injury claims, etc.), nor is it its own definition
disease (since it stipulates exceptions and suffers from underbreadth).
61. FDA COMMISSION ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, supra note 46.

in
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of
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response to some of the problems mentioned above (especially the criticism
that the damage clause does not capture diseases in an ordinary sense), and
in an attempt to be more responsive to its goals, such as protecting health,
the FDA sought to change its definition of disease through notice and
comment rule-making. As a primary reason for changing its definition:
FDA tentatively concluded that it did not want to retain the older
health claims definition because its use of the term ‘damage’
could be interpreted to limit the definition to serious or long-term
diseases, and could imply that there needed to be pathological
evidence of damage, which is not always present. For example,
most mental illnesses have no evidence of anatomic damage, yet
are clearly diseases.62
The FDA proposed a new definition of disease by notice in April of 1998.63
According to this proposed definition:
Disease or health-related condition means any deviation from,
impairment of, or interruption of the normal structure or function
of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body
that is manifested by a characteristic set of one or more signs or
symptoms (including laboratory or clinical measurements that are
characteristic of a disease), or a state of health leading to such
deviation, impairment, or interruption; except that diseases
resulting from essential nutrient deficiencies (e.g., scurvy,
pellagra) are not included in this definition (claims pertaining to
such diseases are thereby not subject to this section or section
101.70).64
Call the term defined the definiendum. Call the definition of the term
the definiens. The definiendum is, in the proposed definition, not merely
‘disease’ but also “health-related condition.” The reason for the inclusion
of the term “health-related condition” is that its inclusion makes the
account consistent with other parts of FDA regulation. A health-related
condition is “a state of health leading to disease.”65 The most important
change between the old definiens and the new is that the new one excludes
the concept of damage from the definition. Also, in the first prong of the
definiens, the dysfunction prong, the FDA asserts that in order for a

62. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, supra note 41.
63. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 63 Fed. Reg. 23625 (proposed Apr.
29, 1998).
64. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, supra note 41, at 23631, 23632.
65. Id.
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dysfunction to constitute a disease, it must also have a manifestation of a
characteristic set of signs or symptoms. In other respects, this new
definition is similar to the DSHEA definition.
This proposed definition improves on the FDA’s definition in several
ways. First, it removes the concept of damage and allows for injuries to be
understood purely in functional terms, such that an injury is a state of
health causing dysfunction. Damage, therefore, is not essential to a
regulatory definition.66 Second, the proposed definition expands the
definiendum to include more than ‘disease.’ The inclusion of “healthrelated condition” moves in the right direction, but the definiens of “healthrelated condition” is not wholly satisfactory. “Health-related condition” is
defined as a state of health leading to disease (see above), which makes it
seem that ‘disease’ is defined by the first definiendum while “health-related
condition” is defined by the second definiendum. This is purely a
pragmatic criticism, however, and does not necessarily undermine the
definition conceptually. Moreover, some might find that treating an injury
as just a state of health leading to disease to be counter-intuitive.
Nevertheless, the revised definition is clearer than the DSHEA definition.
A purpose of the proposed definition is clear: to eliminate the concept
of damage from the FDA’s definition of ‘disease,’ in order to enhance
regulation of drugs and dietary supplements by focusing on claims
involving characteristic signs or symptoms. The FDA stated:
[T]he agency relied upon standard medical and legal definitions
of disease as a basis for a proposed regulatory definition. The
agency then used the proposed definition of disease to generate
workable criteria, by applying the proposed definition to a wide
variety of statements currently made by dietary supplement
manufacturers to determine whether the statements claimed an
effect on [sic] “disease,” as tentatively defined. Based upon the
information derived from these reviews, the agency developed
the general criteria below.67
Disease claims under the regulatory scheme are, in a manner of speaking,
special kinds of structure-function claims. Under the old regime, dietary
supplement structure-function claims are not drug claims, in part because
the structures and functions they purport to regulate or maintain are neither
associated with dysfunction paired with damage, nor lead to such
dysfunction.
66. For example, a broken arm is a damaged arm, but it is also a dysfunctional arm. If,
plausibly, where there is damage, there is dysfunction, and the new definition will omit
nothing that the old definition included.
67. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,624,
23,625 (Apr. 29, 1998).
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The FDA was concerned about standard disease claims and implied
disease claims. Moreover, the Agency followed comments from a
commission, members of which “were troubled about the wording of
structure/function statements suggest[ing] that the most problematic
wording is seen in statements ostensibly relating to ‘normal healthy
function’ [sic] that actually imply the need to remedy an underlying
abnormal or unhealthy state.”68 This is a more recent concern and does not
easily fit into the five values behind dietary supplement regulation
discussed above. The concern is that the dietary supplement manufacturers
would create a desire for their product that is both wasteful and potentially
harmful. For example, the advertisement for Lucidrol might imply that
lack of “tunnel vision” needs a remedy, and that with this remedy in place,
a person “will achieve desired results—whatever they may be.” Another
concern of FDA was that “[a] statement may contain an express or implied
disease claim if it suggests that the product cures, mitigates, treats or
prevents a disease or diseases by augmenting the body’s own diseasefighting capabilities.”69
This is the foremost healthcare concern
surrounding claims made by dietary supplements.
These illustrations of the FDA’s concerns more practically locate the
problem. The FDA was preoccupied with its ability to regulate products
bearing claims about treatment of migraine headaches and depression,70
which in many cases are not accompanied by damage nor necessarily cause
damage in any ordinary sense. Along this line, the FDA felt that it could
regulate the claim “treatment of epilepsy” under its then-current regime,
since epilepsy is a disease under the old definition, but the Agency was
concerned that it could not regulate the claim “prevention of seizures”
under its then-current regime.71
The FDA received criticism that aging, menopause, and other
biological states/functions would be diseases under the proposed
definition.72 The FDA denies this claim.73 Whether pregnancy meets the
proposed definition of disease is more controversial than whether
pregnancy meets the current definition of ‘disease.’74 Nevertheless,
68. Id. at 23,626.
69. Id. at 23,627.
70. Id.
71. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,824,
36,825 (July 8, 1999).
72. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 65 Fed. Reg. 1,000,
1,019 (Jan. 6, 2000).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 1,020 (“FDA has reconsidered proposed § 101.93(g)(2)(iii), and has
concluded that it is not appropriate, under DSHEA, to treat certain common, nonserious
conditions associated with natural states as diseases. There are a wide variety of conditions

TUPA COMMENT - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

862

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/3/2013 4:17 PM

[Vol. 15:3

pregnancy plainly leads to dysfunction as much as many conditions
classified as diseases in an ordinary sense.75 The FDA was also concerned
with the distinction between “lowers cholesterol” and “maintains healthy
cholesterol levels.”76 This exemplifies the grey area between disease
claims and structure-function claims as discussed above. Ultimately, the
FDA declined to revise its definition of ‘disease.’ According to the agency,
“[t]he final rule classifies many more claims as structure/function claims
than the proposed rule would have.”77
Admittedly, the proposed definition is far from perfect. It would still
leave the classification of pregnancy unresolved except by declaration of an
exception, which is regulation by private definition (private, that is, to the
FDA). Addressing the universal process of aging remains an issue. It
certainly does not help by way of clarification that ‘disease’ shows up in
the explanation of ‘characteristic set’ as part of the definition of ‘disease.’
Perhaps in this regard, the proposed definition of disease mimics the way
the FDA’s definition of food makes reference to food as it is colloquially
understood.
Two resources help to explain the FDA’s reasoning for its decision to
retain its old definition: a National Law Journal article that details a
meeting organized by the FDA to compare and contrast the two definitions
of ‘disease’ and the Federal Register comments that explain why the FDA
rejected their proposed definition and retained their old definition in the
final rule. Both sources discuss the FDA’s reliance on the difficulty in
conforming the proposed definition of disease to the concept of disease in a
commonsense way. This reliance is surprising. A great deal of
philosophical work has been done in explicating the concept of disease, and
the FDA seems not to have explored these careful developments. Also, the
FDA, for whatever reason, was very concerned with making the definition
of disease correspond to the concept of disease, when it does not make this

representing impaired function of an organ or system that are associated with particular
stages of life or normal physiologic processes. These stages and processes include
adolescence, the menstrual cycle, pregnancy, menopause, and aging. FDA notes that,
contrary to the comments, the proposed rule would not have classified these stages or
processes themselves as diseases; it classified only certain abnormal conditions associated
with these stages or processes as diseases. The conditions associated with these stages or
processes can vary from common, relatively mild abnormalities, for which medical attention
is not required, to serious conditions that can cause significant or permanent harm if not
effectively treated.”).
75. See Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 65 Fed. Reg. 1,000
(Jan. 6, 2000) (highlighting FDA’s revised criteria as they apply to natural conditions such
as menopause or pregnancy).
76. Id. at 1,018.
77. Id. at 1,004.
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correspondence a priority in other areas for regulatory purposes (e.g. ‘food’
includes gum).
The FDA received over 235,000 comments during the notice/comment
procedure.78 Most of these were form letters, but over 22,000 were
individual letters from the dietary supplement industry, trade associations,
health professional groups, and consumers.79 Not all of them had to do
with the concept of disease.80 Nearly all of the letters from the dietary
supplements industry were against the proposed definition of ‘disease.’81
Nearly all of the letters from health care providers, such as doctors, nurses,
and organizations devoted to aspects of one or a set of diseases were in
favor of the proposed definition, in part because the proposed definition
corresponds better to the concept of disease and medical definitions of
disease.82 The FDA set up a meeting between members of the health care
community and regulatory experts in this area, and, while they could not
settle on a definition of ‘disease,’ the conclusion was that because of the
support of the healthcare community, the FDA would likely adopt the
proposed definition in the final rule.83 The final rule likely came as a great
surprise to the panelists.
The argument in favor of the proposed definition was based on the
overly restrictive damage element of the definition of ‘disease.’84 In
particular, health professionals pointed out a number of recognized disease
conditions for which it is not currently possible to identify physical damage
to an organ, part, or system of the body, including most psychiatric diseases
(depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and obsessive compulsive
disorder, among others), and the early stages of certain metabolic diseases,
including diabetes, genetic diseases, and nutritional deficiency diseases.85
The FDA rejected this line of thinking because they suggested that
‘damage’ would be present in the following conditions:
The requirement of “damage to an organ, part, structure, or
system of the body such that it does not function properly”
indicates that a condition may be considered a disease if there is
direct evidence of structural damage to an organ, part, structure,
or system of the body, or indirect evidence of damage, indicated
78. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 65 Fed. Reg. 1,000,
1,000 (Jan. 6, 2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1,017.
82. Id.
83. Richard Wood et al., Panel Debates New Dietary Supplement Regulations, NAT’L
L.J., Nov. 29, 1999, at B12.
84. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements 65 Fed. Reg. at 1,017.
85. Id. at 1010.
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by the failure of the organ, part, structure, or system of the body
to function properly. This interpretation is appropriate because
otherwise well-recognized psychiatric diseases, migraine
headaches, hypertension, blood lipid disorders, and many other
well-accepted diseases, could be excluded from coverage due to
the lack of direct evidence of physical damage.86
The quotation is included in full to demonstrate the FDA’s
problematic reasoning. First, the argument begs the question.87 This is
clearest in the second sentence, which that a counterexample to the
statutory definition of disease somehow proves that the definition cannot
imply the counterexample. Thus, the second sentence of the argument
must be completely disregarded and, in fact, counts against the old
definition (except the hypertension example). The first sentence is
similarly problematic. The issue the FDA is trying to resolve is not the
evidence of a disease or whether something may be considered a disease,
but the criterion for disease. The evidence or reason for consideration is
not the criterion. So, one easily can see why the old definition is rational
on these lines of argument.
However, the FDA offers a stronger argument for retaining the old
definition. The FDA stated that it believed that Congress, in the passing of
the NLEA, “should be presumed to have been aware of the 1993 FDA
definition of ‘disease or health-related condition’ and to have intended the
FDA to use that definition.”88 Moreover, as the FDA notes, the background
to the definition is Congress’ intent to widen the scope of available
structure/function claims for dietary supplements.89
Narrowing the
definition in order to restrict the scope would be contrary to congressional
intent. Thus, the FDA does have good reason for retaining the old
definition. Nevertheless, the arguments above suggest that Congress
should adopt the proposed definition, even if the FDA cannot. Moreover,
there is another way to view congressional intent such that adopting the
new definition is consistent.
First, a strong majority of members of the health care industry was in
favor of the proposed definition. The FDA and health care providers are
primarily concerned that people will take supplements and forego better,

86. Id.
87. Begging the question here is to be understood in a technical way as identifying a
kind of fallacy of reasoning, and not in the contemporary corruption of the phrase meaning,
roughly, an answer to a question that evokes a further question. To beg the question in the
technical way is to assume the truth of the conclusion in a reason for the conclusion.
88. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,824,
36,825 (July 8, 1999).
89. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 1,017.
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empirically grounded health care measures and that such unregulated
products are dangerous to consumers. Health care practitioners have only a
very modest interest, if any at all, in adopting the proposed definition,
while the dietary supplement industry has a financial incentive to retain the
old definition. While this consideration is not decisive, it does demonstrate
what is at stake for the key parties involved in the regulations. Second, it is
reasonable to assume that Congress intended the term ‘disease claim’ to
cover, at the very least, conditions that fall under the ordinary concept of
disease and not capture other conditions that are not thought to be diseases.
Yet, as has been shown, the old definition does not achieve this end. Since
“damage” is not technically defined in the statute, and an ordinary
definition of “damage” would lead to improper application, the FDA
should use a commonsense approach. Third, the FDA currently asserts that
it has the power to redefine ‘disease.’ The FDA, after it offered its own
arguments for retaining its old definition of disease, said that “[i]f
experience shows a public health need for a different or broader definition,
however, the FDA will consider initiating a rulemaking to amend that
definition.”90 Revising the definition is within the range of the FDA’s
claimed authority, so long as there is need for change.
Moving forward, the FDA has several options. It could retain its old,
statutory definition, adopt its proposed definition, or adopt an alternative
definition. The next section explains a philosophical definition of disease
and explores its potential application in FDA regulation of dietary
supplements.
IV. A NATURALIST PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF DISEASE
Philosophers (and healthcare practitioners thinking philosophically)
have given a great deal of thought to the concepts of health and disease.
Although there is disagreement on the concept of disease, one branch of
philosophers have argued for a definition of the term ‘disease’ that is
similar to the FDA’s proposed definition. An examination of a key
philosopher’s definition of disease will be helpful in analyzing the
underlying conceptual issues of the debate between the FDA definitions of
‘disease.’
Broadly speaking, there are two philosophical schools of thought on
the concept of health and disease. The “evaluative” school members argue
that a disease is a biological function or status coupled with a subjective

90. Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 1,010.
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negative evaluation of that function or status.91 The “naturalist” school
members argue that a disease is biological functioning outside, and below,
the range of normal biological functioning. For this school, the concepts of
health and disease are value-free in the sense that ‘health’ and ‘disease’ are
not defined by essential reference to values. Rather, they are defined only
in reference to biological functioning of certain sorts. Although the debate
between the evaluative school and the naturalist school continues, this
Comment focuses on the naturalist account of disease and one of its most
prominent voices, Christopher Boorse.
In a series of papers culminating in his essay A Rebuttal on Health,
Boorse develops and defends the naturalist position. Boorse calls his
theory the “Biostatistical Theory of Health.” “Health,” according to
Boorse, is defined by four concepts:
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform
functional design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the
reference class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their
individual survival and reproduction. 3. A disease is a type of
internal state which is either an impairment of normal functional
ability, i.e. a reduction of one or more functional abilities below
typical efficiency, or a limitation on functional ability caused by
environmental agents. 4. Health is the absence of disease.92
First, Boorse identifies health as normal function of a part or process that
statistically contributes to individual survival and reproduction. Second,
Boorse separates individuals on the basis of sex, age and race; health is
relative to the extent to which one’s biological functioning statistically
meets the ends of individual survival and reproduction according to one’s
sex, age and race. Disease is then defined as operation below the statistical
normal range (for one’s sex, age and race) for two reasons: impairment or
environmental agents. Conceptually, there is room for a class of “superfunctioning” or positive health, which is part functioning above the normal
range.93
91. See TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., The Concepts of Health and Disease, in
EVALUATION AND EXPLANATION IN THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 125–43 (Tristram Engelhardt
& Stuart Spicker eds., 1975) (arguing that the concept of health is essentially value-laden);
see also MAHESH ANANTH, IN DEFENSE OF AN EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPT OF HEALTH:
NATURE, NORMS, AND HUMAN BIOLOGY, 107–15 (2008) (laying out the debate between
naturalists and the opponents of naturalism about the concept of health, and ultimately
defending a hybrid conceptualization that is predominantly naturalistic).
92. CHRISTOPHER BOORSE, A Rebuttal on Health, in WHAT IS DISEASE? 7–8 (James M.
Humber & Robert Almedert eds., 1997).
93. Boorse has a bell curve chart that illustrates an idealization of his definitions of
“health” and “disease.” The majority of people fall into the middle sections, with the
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Boorse’s definitions of “disease” and “health” do not include the
concept of damage (as in the FDA’s existing definition) or the concept of
characteristic symptoms or signs associated with diseases (as in the FDA’s
proposed definition). An “exchange” between the FDA and a critic of the
FDA’s proposed definition is illuminating:
Most of these comments [from the dietary supplement industry]
argued that the new [proposed] definition is too broad, sweeping
in many minor deviations or abnormalities that are not diseases.
(Many of these comments did not appear to have understood that
the definition required not only a deviation, but one that ‘is
manifested by a characteristic set of one or more signs or
symptoms.’)94
Boorse’s definition is not vulnerable to such criticism because it defines
“normal” as a range of functioning, not a point of functioning or structure.
Mild deviations from the absolute point of statistical normalcy would not
be diseases. This broader definition of “normal functioning” captures the
intuitive notion that there are many ways to have part or system-normal
function, but, at a certain point, partial function becomes dysfunctional.
Given its comments, however, the FDA does not seem to understand this
implication. It does not acknowledge “borderline” cases for the criteria of
damage, sign and symptoms, and dysfunction.
Here is a helpful contrast between either of the FDA’s definitions and
Boorse’s definition. The FDA’s definitions each have at least two difficult
grey areas: one for dysfunction and one for the associated physical
property, whether it be damage or characteristic signs. With Boorse’s
definition of disease there is just the grey area with dysfunction. Moreover,
without the concept of damage, Boorse’s definition of disease easily
captures leukemia and colon cancer in a way that FDA’s definition can
only get in an expanded, non-colloquial sense of “damage” and
“dysfunction.”
One might object to Boorse’s definition on the grounds that there is no
clear line between normal function and disease (at below normal) or superfunction (at above normal). Admittedly, with Boorse’s definition, there
will be hard cases. An example that recurs throughout discussion on this

diseased having lesser function, and those with “positive health” on the higher functioning
side of the bell curve. Id., at 8.
94. 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1009. The FDA seems here to have been influenced by a
medical doctor’s suggestion from the FDA meeting on the proposed definition of disease
during the notice/comment period. See Richard Wood et al., Panel Debated New Dietary
Supplement Regulations: Focus was on FDA’s Definition of disease, ‘Natural States’ and
‘Implied’ Disease Claims, 22(14) NAT’L L.J. 10 (Nov. 29, 1999) (discussing questions
posed by the FDA).
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topic, including this Comment, is that of blood pressure and hypertension.
There is a range of normal blood pressure. The medical community sets
the standard for when blood pressure becomes a disease (hypertension).
There is a grey area perhaps, with pre-hypertension, a zone that doctors
identify between normal blood pressure and hypertension. Yet the medical
community establishes certain protocols for treatment at each stage. Those
in the upper level of the normal range are not given drugs, but rather,
lifestyle suggestions, and perhaps a dietary supplement, such as an Omega3 Fatty Acid. If the blood pressure increases, then a drug-intervention is
used. This is a model of how Boorse’s account works through the grey
areas. The categories of normal function are set by particularized statistical
findings within one’s age, sex, and perhaps race. The medical community
sets the standards for proper treatment. Sometimes, the treatment standards
are changed by the medical community (for example, if the category of
hypertension were to be changed slightly to include lower blood pressure
ranges), but the decision-making is performed by those best situated to
make decisions. There is no better way forward when applying the concept
in the real world. Thus, while there are grey areas of function, Boorse’s
theory fares much better than either of FDA’s approaches.
Other benefits would stem from incorporating Boorse’s definitions of
health and disease into the regulatory framework of dietary supplements
and drugs. First, as explored above, the concept of pregnancy caused
problems for both of the FDA’s definitions of disease. The FDA
maintained that pregnancy, under either of their definitions, was not a
disease, yet pregnancy meets the conditions of the definitions, and products
that claim to prevent and “cure” pregnancy must be regulated as drug
claims. Using Boorse’s model prevents such awkwardness: since
pregnancy serves an end to human functioning, it is not a disease. It does
sometimes conflict with another one of Boorse’s proposed ends, that of
individual survival, but the overall framework allows room for the claim
that pregnancy is not a disease. The FDA’s current definition of “drug”
still captures any product that bears a claim that it prevents pregnancy, but
it is unclear on what grounds the FDA imposes that regulation.
In this area, there is an untoward implication of Boorse’s definition—
that a woman taking birth control pills is thereby giving herself a disease.
Although unsatisfactory for political reasons, it seems conceptually within
the bounds of disease, and plausibly, infertility in the absence of birth
control in a young woman is a disease.95 Moreover, Boorse’s account deals

95. Since Boorse’s definition is relative to one’s age, the infertility in a young woman
is a disease, yet infertility in an older woman is not a disease. Infertility treatment in an
older woman would then be an elective health care treatment, not a disease cure. This is
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better with “natural states” and conditions associated with such states. The
menstrual cycle, for example, is one such state. Because it has a
reproductive function and is statistically normal relative to certain ages,
normal menstrual cycle function is not a disease in Boorse’s account of
health and disease in a straightforward way. Moreover, the natural state of
aging, and conditions associated with aging, is easily accounted for by
Boorse’s definition, which considers age when determining normal
function.
Boorse’s definitions of health and disease highlight a problem with the
FDA’s proposed definition of disease. The proposed definition does not
state clearly that functioning outside the range of normal must be a
deficiency of function.96 The terms that the proposed definition uses are
“deviation from,” “impairment of,” or “interruption of” the normal
structure or function of a part or whole of the organism. The terms
“deviation from” and “interruption of” do not necessary indicate a
dysfunction. For example, Usain Bolt has a level of functioning in his
sprint running that is an extreme deviation from what is normal, yet he does
not thereby suffer from a disease. There are many such examples of people
functioning outside, but above, the range of normal.
The FDA is then reduced to defining the dysfunction of disease in
terms of impairment of function. The concept of impairment works well
for some functions of diseased states, but not all. “Impair” is defined as “to
damage or make worse or as if by diminishing in some material respect.”97
The standard dictionary definition of impair does not get at the nerve of the
disease concept, at least in many cases, since impairment refers to some
factor that causes some further damage or dysfunction or diminished
health. While some diseases behave this way, others do not; they are in
themselves dysfunctions. For example, if stress causes hypertension, the
disease is hypertension, not stress. In effect, the lack of a clear “below
normal” functioning requirement in the definition of disease reduces the
first disjunct of the definition (dysfunction) to the second (state of health
causing later dysfunction), or at least implies this in some cases. Boorse’s
definition of disease uses the concept of impairment and limitation caused
by environmental agents. However, Boorse has a way around the around
the objection expressed above by reference to a technical distinction

intuitive, since pregnancy past a certain age is contrary to the individual survival of the
would-be mother.
96. This is one way in which the current definition is superior to the proposed
definition.
97. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 581 (10th ed. 1998). The fonts and
stylistic markings are exactly as they appear in the dictionary.
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between internal and external states.98 Boorse builds the concept of
“internal state” into his definition of disease. Yet, the FDA does not have
recourse to such a distinction in the proposed definition. The FDA’s
definitions can be improved by eliminating or supplementing the
“impairment condition” of the definition in order to capture the notion of
functioning below normal so as to constitute dysfunction, and not just
outside normal functioning.
Boorse admits that his definition of disease captures what one
ordinarily thinks of as injuries.99 Boorse’s definition has precisely the
“good overbreadth” that the FDA’s definitions do for regulatory purposes.
Boorse likely would think that further refinement of the definitions of
“health” and “disease” would rule out such overbreadth, yet, for the
purposes of regulation, such overbreadth is essential.
In summation, Boorse’s definition of disease is conceptually superior
to either of the FDA’s definitions, and leads to clearer application.100 With
regard to the FDA’s current definition, a central problem is the inclusion of
the concept of damage. Neither health care practitioners, nor philosophers,
nor ordinary people think that disease is necessarily accompanied by
damage or a health state leading to such dysfunction. Another central
problem is that pregnancy meets the old definition of disease, a statement
that the FDA wishes to avoid. Boorse’s theory dodges these two
objections, first by not using the concept of damage, but of deviation from,
and below, the normal range of function; and, second, by including
reproduction as an end state for normal functioning. On Boorse’s account,
the FDA could regulate any product that claims to prevent pregnancy
because it meets the definition of a drug as a product intended to alter the
structure and function of the body, and such a claim does not meet the
conditions of a disease claim.
Boorse’s theory also fares better than FDA’s proposed definition. As
noted above, the requirement that a disease have characteristic signs or
symptoms is either vacuous, since dysfunction will necessarily always have
a sign or symptom, or it is circular, since it uses “disease” in order to define
“disease.” Alternatively, if the internal “disease” term is not meant in a
technical way, then this would exclude injuries (and poisonings, etc.) from
inclusion in the set denoted by the technical definition, which the FDA

98. BOORSE, supra note 92 at 67–69.
99. Id. at 6 (suggesting that “injuries, poisonings, environmental traumas, growth
disorders, functional impairments, [and perhaps other unspecified conditions] inconsistent
with perfect health” all fall within his definition of disease). It is unclear why Boorse thinks
that growth disorders fall within the ordinary concept of disease.
100. The regulatory implications of this incorporation will be discussed in the next
section of this Comment.
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would ideally have jurisdiction over in order to regulate effectively.
Second, the FDA seems to miss a key implication of the fact that normal
function is a range, and not a precise point. Third, the proposed definition
does not adequately account for sub-normal function, instead of above
normal function, as one would be in a kind of super-functioning
(impairment is not up to the task, at least in the straightforward way the
FDA seems to think). Fourth, the proposed definition, at least by the FDA
claim, classifies pregnancy as a non-disease, despite its meeting the
conditions of the proposed definition of “disease.” Boorse’s definition of
disease has none of these problems.
Moreover, Boorse’s definition of disease would effectively distinguish
some of the claims that have troubled the FDA. The FDA, which can
regulate claims of treating epilepsy as a drug claim, was concerned that it
would be powerless to regulate the claim that a product “prevents
seizures.” Boorse’s definitions of “health” and “disease,” could deal with
this simply since seizures are below normal function to such an extent that
that functioning constituted a disease. Moreover, migraine headaches, if
persistent, would be below normal functioning of the brain or some other
part of the body, and thus persistent migraine headaches would be
classified as a disease. Depression is somewhat more complicated. The
FDA, in adopting Boorse’s definition, could treat depression as a biological
dysfunction, and thus a straightforward disease. Alternatively, the FDA
could treat depression as a mental dysfunction, and thus not a
straightforward disease on Boorse’s (or either of the FDA’s definitions for
that matter) account. Having said this, there is no reason to think that the
general statistical model that Boorse develops cannot be also extended to
drawing a line between normal mental function and mental dysfunction.
The issue of “mental health” is quite difficult, and Boorse’s account of
health and disease does no worse than the FDA’s definitions, and Boorse’s
biostatistical account of health can naturally extend to a mental-statistical
account of mental wellness or health.101 Perhaps it is likely that depression
is both a biological and psychological phenomenon, so a mix of statistical
accounts would be appropriate for at least many kinds of depression.
V. TWO PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE FDA REGULATION
As noted above, the FDA, in its explanation for retaining its old
definition of disease, said that “[i]f experience shows a public health need

101. Indeed, Boorse tentatively suggests such an extension. BOORSE, supra note 92 at
149–50.
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for a different or broader definition, however, FDA will consider initiating
a rulemaking to amend that definition.”102
The FDA should adopt Boorse’s definition. The agency defines
disease in this technical way only for 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6), the section that
sets out the dietary supplement regime, and the gap between the technical
definition and the colloquial definition has led to some implausible
consequences. In adopting Boorse’s more conceptually plausible definition
of disease for 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6), the FDA could close the gap.103
Boorse’s definition can readily be integrated into FDA dietary supplement
regulation. It defines disease in terms of structure and function; thus it
suits the FDA definition of drug as a product intended to alter the structure
or function of a person. Boorse’s definition is overbroad compared to the
colloquial concept of disease, since it includes injuries and poisonings, but
it is overbroad in a way that health care practitioners and the FDA itself
seem to (and should) want.
A second reason follows from FDA’s assertion that it has the power to
change its definition of disease for regulatory purposes if there is sufficient
need. What all of the overbreath and underbreadth criticisms show is not
so much that there is a regulatory problem with drugs, but, rather, that since
the FDA cannot easily include that which by all accounts it ought to
regulate under the capture of disease, then it cannot possibly do the work it
needs to for the vague claims of dietary supplements. Moreover, even if
looking at intent rather than the exact text, a broad construal of
congressional intent is to have a definition of disease that works best for
regulatory purposes, and does not, for example, classify pregnancy as a
disease, or somehow rule out what one commonly thinks of as disease as
from a regulatory perspective disease, such as the examples above of
slowly-developing diseases without colloquial damage or future, further
dysfunction. Thus, there is good reason to believe that the FDA could
adopt Boorse’s definition of disease without congressional action in
accordance with the FDA’s own claims.
A more provocative proposal for the FDA regulation of dietary
supplements is to eliminate reference to disease altogether in dietary

102. 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1010.
103. The exception for diseases from dietary insufficiencies, such as scurvy, should be
included in Boorse’s definition for regulatory purposes. The FDA also uses the concept of
“disease” in its basic definition of “device,” a primary, large regulatory jurisdiction of the
FDA. The FDA might be able to adopt Boorse’s definition outright in the device
jurisdiction, and probably should not include an exception for dietary insufficiency diseases,
such as scurvy in that arena. This is outside the scope of this Comment, but there should be
great attraction in having an almost completely unified definition of disease that stands
throughout FDA’s various jurisdictions.
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supplement and drug regulation. The FDA has trouble with using
“disease” in its regulations. First, the FDA relies on the ordinary concept
of disease in order to identify the relevant class of disease claims (e.g.,
colon cancer), since the concept of damage is not present in such cases, nor
is future, other dysfunction statistically indicated in a range of such cases.
Second, the FDA asserts, against its own definition, that some conditions
that meet its definition of disease are not diseases on the definition (e.g.,
pregnancy and aging). Third, the FDA is rationally committed to claiming
that certain conditions that are not diseases meet the disease definition
(e.g., injuries, poisonings). Fourth, in order to deal with these cases in just
the right way, the FDA can make use of part (C) of its definition of “drug”
exclusively which allows for the FDA to assert jurisdiction over any
product that is intended to alter structure or function. Fifth, the FDA
regulation under 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6) is not doing as much conceptual
regulatory work as had been thought with the definition of disease; nor is
the ordinary concept of disease within the definition of drug doing
regulatory work. Instead, the FDA relies on pure claims involving
alterations to structure and function.104
The FDA’s proposed definition fares better with the first problem (and
perhaps the second), but it creates new problems by resting the definition of
disease on the concept of impairment, which is more suited to injuries than
to disease. Furthermore, and somewhat superficially, the FDA does not
capture the more plausible understanding of the concept of normal function
as a range, rather than a precise point of normal functioning or structures.
Boorse’s definition of disease does away with these problems, and it deals
with the two unhappy further implications of the proposed definition, yet it
does not deal with the other problems.
The FDA could adopt Boorse’s definition of disease, yet not regulate
what falls under the definition as disease; rather, the criterion merely lays
out what is to be regulated. Thus, the FDA would regulate all products that
claim to alter a type of internal state, which is either an impairment of
normal functional ability, i.e., a reduction of one or more functional
abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on functional ability
caused by environmental agents relative to age, sex and race and the ends

104. Another way of characterizing the argument is that the FDA can assert jurisdiction
over products that meet either the “disease” part of its definition of “drug” or the “(other
than food) intent to alter structure or function” part of its definition. Since there is tension
between the two understandings of “disease” (the “drug” definition is not technical, but the
21 C.F.R. § 101.93 definition is technical), then the focus falls in some cases on the “(other
than food) intent to alter structure or function” part. However, so this argument goes, there
is no substantive “carve-out” for clear application—merely asserting that the definition does
not apply to so-called “foods” does not provide a clear, substantive regulatory criterion.
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as judged by individual survival and reproduction.105 In order to capture
claims such as those made by Lucidrol, the FDA would need to regulate
claims that assert that a product can take one above the range of statistically
normal functioning—into “super-functioning.”106 In order to capture birth
control pills, the FDA would need to assert jurisdiction over anything that
claimed to put one below the range of normal functioning. The resulting
rule is quite straightforward: Any claim that asserts a shift from one zone
(of below, normal, or super-functioning) to another zone is a claim that
must be regulated with drug claim scrutiny. A great confusion regarding
FDA regulation is how two seemingly equivalent claims can be treated
differently—a claim that a product helps maintain normal function is
considered a structure-function claim, yet if the same product stated it
could prevent later dysfunction, it would be considered a disease claim.
The proposal just expressed makes sense of the two different claims—that
dietary supplements cannot bear claims that assert or imply that taking the
substance prevents one from dropping into lower part- or systemdysfunction (that is to say—that one would drop into the lower level of
functioning without the product), it merely helps the system function within
the normal range. Any claim that merely asserts maintenance within the
normal zone of functioning is allowed as a kind of health claim (and there
are subdivisions within this class of health claims classification along the
lines of the health claims discussed above, with the exception of diseaseprevention claims—a kind of health claim in the current regulatory
regime—which would then fall either to a middle class of regulatory
scrutiny, or drug-scrutiny, which they almost do already).107 To illustrate
the potential consequences of such a regime, Lucidrol’s claim would be
brought under FDA drug-scrutiny (and therefore need pre-approval after
testing, etc.), whereas Alpha Lipoic Acid’s claim might be allowed as one
of the kinds of health claims, which seems appropriate given current
scientific knowledge of antioxidants.
This second proposal, a change in the FDA regulatory system, might
require congressional action. It is unclear whether the FDA’s power to
change its definition of disease includes the power to stop calling what it
105. For regulatory purposes, the FDA should keep the nutrient deficiency exception
even if it were to adopt Boorse’s definition in the way proposed.
106. The Federal Trade Commission and the National Advertising Division of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. provide additional oversight of dietary supplement
claims, especially performance-enhancing dietary supplement claims. John E. Villafranco
& Andrew B. Lustigman, Regulation of Dietary Supplement Advertising: Current Claims of
Interest to the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration and National
Advertising Division, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 709 (2007).
107. Claims that assert maintenance within low level functioning and super-functioning
zones would be rare, and would likely be regulated with drug claim scrutiny.
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regulates “claims about health and disease,” opting instead, on the second
proposal, for regulating claims about biological functions and effects on
biological functions. Nevertheless, it would be a vast improvement over
the existing system—a significant improvement over an adoption of the
proposed definition of disease, and a moderate improvement over the
adoption of Boorse’s definition of disease. What is clear is that the second
proposal is true to the idea exemplified in the discussion throughout this
Comment that the FDA is not only concerned with regulating claims about
products that treat, cure, mitigate or prevent diseases as diseases are
colloquially understood. Rather, the FDA is concerned with regulating
claims about all sorts of conditions, such conditions unified by the concept
of biological dysfunction.
This second proposal of dropping the phrase “disease” altogether from
the identification of the set of the regulated claims borne by food and drugs
is offered as a provocative proposal. Yet the core idea has appeal—neither
drugs nor dietary supplements are limited to “bringing up” one’s function
from disease or near-disease functioning. In addition to capturing the
concepts of treatment or prevention of injuries, poisonings, commonsense
diseases, etc., there is the concept of performance-enhancing (as Lucidrol’s
label asserts). Boorse’s definition of health and the more radical proposal
could each deal with these claims in their own unified way. Yet as it
stands, the FDA’s current regulatory regime is the worst of the four
possibilities under consideration.
CONCLUSION
What is clear is that adopting Boorse’s definition is within the claimed
power of the FDA, given need for change. The values expressed above,
such as foregone healthcare, public health, waste of money and others
suggest that there is a need for change. Boorse’s definitions of health and
disease would remedy some of the regulatory mess that the FDA has
created with its old definition of disease. Moreover, the dietary supplement
manufacturers would benefit to some extent by a clearer regulatory regime
(especially since, as noted above, the FDA seems to be making exceptions
to its definition by using what can only be described as a private principle
or no principle at all). By not including a definitional element of damage
(or causing damage-dysfunction), Boorse’s definition would more clearly
map onto a commonsense way of regulating dietary supplements. As
implied above, this proposal would not go so far as to capture the claim
borne by Lucidrol, but, like the FDA’s claims about its proposed definition,
it would give the FDA a better tool by which to regulate dietary
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supplements.
Examples such as claims about persistent migraine
headaches and seizures might be the most practical examples of improved
regulations with Boorse’s definition in place, but the principled clarity and
simplicity would also be of great benefit.

